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1 Philosophy’s Confusion 
The Emergence of a New Reality 
There was a time when the bounds of reality were pre-established. During the period that Foucault 
distinguished from the modern era and termed “the Classical Age,” the contours of the world had 
been largely captured on world maps and opportunities to encounter the unknown world had 
gradually disappeared. Natural theology, based on the pre-established concept of a “mechanistic 
world,” holds that, once brought into existence, the universe is governed by necessity. In the world of 
necessity, first crafted as a theological creation, theology and mechanics (science) coexisted 
effortlessly in their different roles. Under this construction, religion and science coexisted 
complementing one another. Since classical mechanics has no mechanism to conceive new realities, 
the bounds of reality became fixed. At this stage, reality and fiction and reality and the imaginary 
could be clearly differentiated. Fiction was nothing more than the opposite of reality or something 
that was extra distinguishable from it. Fiction could serve as pastime or entertainment, but could go 
no further. 
The reorganization of knowledge that took place in the late 18th century and early 19th century 
brought about a change in the bounds of “reality.” Since then, new realities have been emerging 
without cease. Foucault’s The Order of Things presented a new horizon of knowledge wrought by 
parallel developments in biology, economics, and linguistics. It is difficult to exhaustively unpack 
what really happened in these fields. For example, the term “biology” itself was coined during this 
period, and numerous scientists began to use it almost simultaneously. Prior to this, the natural world 
had been divided into the kingdoms of minerals, plants, and animals, a division that had been 
maintained for the 2,300 years since its Aristotelian conception. Concurrently, the mechanisms by 
which individual organisms were established as such–whether this involved relations between 
organs or maintenance of functionality–shifted to become peculiar to the individual. When the 
relations such as the representatives of functionality were generalized, these became the factors that 
determined a species. Each individual defined itself rather than in accordance with standards 
assigned from the outside. Thus, nothing in a self-defining system can be externally predetermined, 
be it in terms of origins or goals toward which the system should move. 
Economics, meanwhile, emphasized the search for the value itself from the descriptions of objects 
(assets). The characteristics of objects were exhaustively listed, one by one, and there followed an 
inquiry into how value comes into being and how it can be produced. In linguistics, the nouns that 
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had been the chief subject of examination gave way to verbs and adjectives. These developments 
provide a clear picture of the change from 18th-century natural history to mechanisms of knowledge 
in the 19th century and beyond and with knowledge losing its external supports and itself becoming 
an object undergoing a process of the production. 
Self-defining systems thus became decentralized and ever open to the possibilities of the arrival of 
new individuals. With self-defining systems themselves becoming capable of continued change, the 
bounds of reality began to be continually updated. Within this continually changing reality, the word 
“human” began to take on new meaning and came to relate, in every setting, to the boundaries of 
reality and the scope of its possibilities. The “human” was an entity to which God had become purely 
external, created in an era with neither point of departure nor point of arrival, the last “stronghold 
of reality” set up as a kind of fiction. 
Among the shifts of this period came the creation of major and multi-faceted “virtual realities.” The 
greatest among these was “the theory of evolution.” Cuvier boasted that he could draw the full profile 
of an animal from the observation of but one of its bones, producing pictures of creatures that seemed 
unlikely to exist or to have existed, whichever way we look at them. 
The logical framework for the theory of evolution comes from the “phylogenetic tree,” an all-
encompassing schema and structure of evolution. The mechanisms of evolution involve “the law of 
use and disuse,” “natural selection,” and “genetic mutation.” While Lamarck and Haeckel drew 
another detailed phylogenetic tree that positioned living creatures in lines of succession, homo 
sapiens was placed at the apex of both. As evolutionary history extended, the “human” became 
positioned at the apex of the entire biological system. 
“Humanity,” at the apex of the phylogenetic tree, was therefore able to experience a certain stability 
for some time. This stability was systematically maintained. For example, it became clear in the field 
of ecology that each living creature has its own particular Umwelt, after von Uexküll. Ticks have their 
own world peculiar to ticks; flies a world unique to flies, and so on. Yet, it does not necessarily follow 
that the unique worlds of ticks and flies form multiple counterbalanced and disparate worlds. These 
unique worlds are in fact subtracted from the world perceived by humans positioned as substantially 
lacking in reality. This is one reason for the “human” being forever the “stronghold of reality,” itself 
a concurrent structural guarantee. 
However, a “conflict of interest” penetrated the framework of the naturally arising argument that 
the “human” is the “stronghold of reality.” Adopting this assertion that the “human” is the “stronghold 
of reality” led to a conflict of interest in that this served naturally to the benefit of humanity. I believe 
I can hear the immediate outcry that, because humanity was the arbiter of reality, it is inevitable that 
humanity’s interests were included in that reality. This is an “epistemological conflict of interest.” All 
offshoots of Kantian theory feature this assertion. 
I seem to hear, too, the claim that nothing can be perceived beyond the world viewed by humans. 
This is a “dialectic tyranny” that hides behind the human frontier mind of “human localism.” The 
reasons for this frontier lie in a logic wherein it is systematically guaranteed and all other possibilities 
is closed. Yet, both these factors run the risk of collapsing at the slightest provocation. Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) runs a completely different kind of calculation and carries a high probability of 
rendering a reality that has previously been invisible to humans. When this happens, it is highly likely 
that this reality will be significantly different from that conceived by humans. 
Technological evolution, including AI, is beginning to promulgate the idea that the very “human” 
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who was positioned at that apex might be only a “virtual reality.” This moves beyond the much-
revisited science fiction scenario in which the flesh and blood human is divested of his job and his 
position at the apex by AI. 
Viewed through the lens of technological evolution, there is nothing unnatural in the human 
transfer of jobs to the AI of their own creation following the division of labor. For example, rice 
cultivation already involves machinery that takes care of the preparatory tillage, the subsequent 
transplanting of seedlings, and the harvesting of the rice. The replacement of taxis with driverless 
models in built-up areas is predicted to begin soon. Robots are now conducting many of the steps in 
surgical procedures. In these settings, it is merely the allocation of labor roles that is changing. Many 
more jobs will be entrusted to AI and robots. Yet, in these cases, it is only the allotment of jobs that is 
changing, while the bounds of reality remain the same. 
Moreover, there is nothing unnatural in the changing level of detail in operations as the memory, 
image analysis, and data processing capacities of AI are utilized. If work can be executed with a higher 
level of minute skill, there is no reason to prevent it. However, if a reality that cannot be directly 
observed by humans is brought to light when this happens, and things come to be understood via a 
method of calculation different from that used by humanity, hitherto absent elements will enter the 
human experience. 
It is believed that changes in the allocation of work within reality will bring few changes that 
encroach upon the “human” himself. The everyday worry of humans that they might lose their job 
will continue to remain as a matter of course. However, the bulk of that concern originates in the 
considerable barrier presented by potentially having to disregard all of one’s previous knowledge 
and begin again, perhaps every two or three years, and the attendant uncertainty. Humans lead a 
biological existence: eating, sleeping, defecating – living – each day. Yet, this is not all. Humans live in 
control of themselves while possessing a self-image. The self-image that the human possesses is the 
“human,” and there are bounds to the reality corresponding to this “human.” 
However, we must question the possibility of reality itself changing its contours and transforming 
boundaries. When this happens, the “human” that has been the “stronghold of reality” will, at least, 
undergo a change in position, and may, depending on the situation, become obsolete and unnecessary. 
A certain tendency toward changing the bounds of reality can be observed within what is generally 
termed “virtual reality.” 
 
The Limits of Noesis (Cognitive Knowledge) 
At this juncture, philosophy does not simply lose the security of noesis and the correlatively 
understood “world.” A collapse of the major, implicit premise of the world’s “natural reality,” seen 
from Aristotle to Kant, would give rise to the question of what noesis actually does. The first object of 
the attack would be the question of whether the world and noesis come into being correlatively. When 
Kant attempted a theory of noesis, the world and noesis were clearly correlative. Further, without 
accepting this premise, it becomes meaningless to discuss the nature of noesis in detail. If the 
framework of noesis is being discussed in detail and yet it is positioned at cross-purposes with the 
world from the start, the question of what is actually being scrutinized becomes renewed. 
The arguments of Meillassoux and Gabriel find their basis in the treatment of “contingency.” There 
are many options and possibilities around the questions of (a) in which scenarios does contingency 
function effectively in the formation of knowledge and (b) how did the formation of knowledge itself 
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begin. Meillassoux argues that contingency is inherent in all scenarios based on the “the necessity for 
contingency.” Gabriel, meanwhile, based on the contingency of necessity, grounds his argument 
saying that, however necessary something may appear, contingency cannot ultimately be eliminated 
from the formation and verification of that necessity. The necessity of contingency and the 
contingency of necessity are separated by a wide gap, the significance of which is elucidated by 
arguments with more possibility for development. 
When something appears contingently, for example, and if subjectivity itself is bound up in that 
appearing thing, there is more occurring beyond the subjectivity apprehending the appearing object. 
At that moment, “existence” cannot be understood in contrast with the subject. Neither can the object 
be grasped by noesis when the former continues to change and its endpoint and predicted result 
cannot be anticipated. This is the point at which the possibility of the wide-ranging concept known as 
“new realism” emerges. 
When dealing with the problem of infinity, too, subjectivity cannot be limited to itself. It is not easy 
to respond with the assembled preexisting tools of philosophy to questions on the kind of existence 
infinite things have. This is because infiniteness is established by an operation other than noesis. 
Under the operations of noesis, at the most we can picture “enumerable infinity.” This is because we 
can imagine an anticipated sum of repetitions reached through the endless reiteration of operations 
whereby addition and other mathematical processes are continuously effected. However, there 
remain no operations capable of mapping to noesis the case of innumerable infinity.  
In the case of the environment, because it in fact surrounds the subject of noesis, it is not itself the 
object of noesis. The place in which noesis occurs cannot become the object of noesis. In this manner, 
the question of the limits of noesis reappears. As the 19th century drew to an end, du Bois-Reymond 
expounded his argument on the “limits of knowledge.” At the core of his argument was the claim that, 
as knowledge expands, we cannot reach “objects themselves” or “force itself,” and a group of 
arguments labeled Neo-Kantianism once again began to gain traction around this time. 
Objects and motion themselves are limiting concepts within noesis, and hence, can only be treated 
as separate from it. For example, we try creating objects from energy, and energy from objects. The 
material is converted to energy on the surface of the sun. This occurs through nuclear fusion. 
Nevertheless, even if one strives to arrive at an object’s or force’s ultimate nature through poiesis, it 
would be impossible as poiesis is not guided by noesis, and hence cannot be recovered by it. 
The greatest issue with correlationism is that the formation of the noetic subject itself is 
incorporated neither as fact nor as question and that, moreover, correlationism lacks even the tools 
required to shed light on this question. The cognizing subject is formed within an environment. This 
formation process raises questions distinct from those of developmental psychology. The formation 
of one’s faculties comes to an end as one becomes a rational adult although there is little expectation 
that they will be complete at this point. Not only will the reality of the world change, but also the 
subjectivity of noesis itself will undergo transformation. If we do not incorporate these scenarios and 
establish our arguments, classical epistemology itself will be reduced to rearranging past data. 
 
The Task of Philosophy 
In this manner, the former “existence” was replaced with the debate over a constantly changing 
“reality,” and the parceled category clusters that had been the conditions for the possibility of noesis 
were exchanged for a discussion on a continually forming subjectivity. Against this backdrop, the 
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actual task of philosophy was once again brought into question. 
Philosophy is an activity that having found an issue and formulizes it in the most generalizable 
form possible. Alternatively, it is the sum of activities rendering visible hitherto invisible realities. 
Furthermore, it is not limited to interpreting reality, but may advance arguments to the effect that it 
may become necessary to change reality itself. We are likely to see assertions that it is not the question 
of how to interpret reality that is of vital importance but the actual changing of that very reality, as 
in Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach. However, philosophy is unfortunately not so powerful to change 
reality, and changing reality is not, in the final analysis, its task. Philosophy would in fact be infinitely 
dangerous if it had such power. 
In fact, philosophy, by itself, does not possess considerable problem-solving ability. In most cases, 
problem-solving is entrusted to science and technology, medicine, law, and economics, which 
demonstrate overwhelmingly superior capacities. During the formation of one’s faculties too, the arts 
often demonstrate superior results to philosophy itself. Philosophy clearly formulates challenges, 
establishes guiding principles, and presents multiple options. As a result, it plays the role of a 
coordinator for the effective advancement of procedures, and in fact can do no more. 
It may be thus considered that it has become necessary to determine new tasks for “philosophy” in 
relation to our “continually transforming reality,” which however cannot be resolved by the 
traditional form of questioning. For example, on the themes of “time” and “existence,” we cannot ask 
questions on the lines of what is “time” and what is “existence.” Asking questions that seek to establish 
what things are is now at cross-purposes with matters as they stand. Placing these topics as the 
grammatical subjects of their questions is also hugely problematic: the truth is not brought into 
question in the form of the subject. It is thought necessary to relate to questions in the order of what 
kind of experiences are time and existence, or whether notable features of the matter come to light 
when certain kinds of experience are foregrounded. Thus, philosophy must change its method of 
posing questions and, further, these matters cannot be understood if these questions are formulated 
with respect to languages. This may be the era in which language ceases to be an easy-to-use 
philosophical tool. 
Presently, the tasks of philosophy may be, first, to shed light on the question of whether there are 
further options somewhere within our changing reality alongside concepts rooted in reflection; 
second, to explain the orientation around patterns that can effectively develop these choices; and, 
third, to predict the extent to which human, societal, and experiential possibilities will expand as a 
result of the aforementioned patterns. In light of this, we are faced with the question of which 
configuration can be adopted in preparation for shaping 22nd-century world philosophy. 
2 Philosophy as Research Program 
In critiquing his teacher Karl Popper’s theory of scientific method (falsificationism), Imre Lakatos 
established a separate framework, labeling his own concept as the “research program.” Central to this 
framework is the fact that various concepts and ideas are not abandoned even when disproved but 
utilized in different ways following minor alteration, and that the positive or negative aspects of a 
program are judged based on whether it is progressive or degenerative, at which point the 
accumulation of observational evidence and the capability of the program in solving its definitive 
and important problems become defining features. Programs are thus projected to follow a 
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concentric model with a group of ideas at its center (unit ideas) and a surrounding cluster of 
observational evidence (the “protective belt”). In Newtonian mechanics, Newton’s three laws of 
motion are unit ideas, remaining untouched by falsification procedures and separated from the 
notion of correctability. Observational evidence corresponds to peripheral expansion within each 
domain, as with materialism and optics. When they have been thus positioned, the unit-ideas 
traditionally correspond to “First Philosophy” and “Logic,” while the protective belt is understood to 
correspond to domain specific philosophies. 
While this unit-idea segment likely does exist, the concept itself varies greatly according to the 
nature of its collection of established rules. 
Classical Mechanics: Classical mechanics involves the rules under which final conclusions are 
determined when initial conditions are fixed. In the concept of free fall, distance to an end-point and 
its timing are determined when the starting position and duration of the fall are fixed. In these cases, 
the procedure is one of fixing the rule constants to fit the result. The gravitational constant 
corresponds to this procedure. This is a procedure whereby the point of departure is prefixed so as 
to fit the result. In other words, the mechanism involved in classical mechanics is essentially a variety 
of teleology; the mechanism is a kind of the teleology in a new guise. 
Conservation Law: The laws of thermodynamics are structured differently. The conservation law 
establishes the major premise that something present at the initial or starting point is conserved in 
the final state. This premise is applied to concepts like the law of conservation of energy. The idea of 
conservation has prevailed since ancient times; later, it was established as “the Great Chain of Being,” 
and now it takes such forms as the law of conservation of momentum, the law of conservation of 
mass, and the law of conservation of energy. The distinctive feature of the conservation law is that, 
while a property is conserved from the initial stage to the final stage, one cannot specify what 
happens between these two points. When striking a match, it may ignite; yet, equally, it may only 
smoke, or the matchstick may break. Expressed in terms of energy amounts, the whole, potential 
energy included, is covered by the law of conservation. Yet, one cannot specifically say what is 
happening in reality. In other words, the laws relating to conservation are characterized by 
“underdetermination.” Under these laws, only the wide outer framework is fixed, while what is 
happening internally is undetermined. 
The Increase in Entropy Principle applies as a limited law within a global closed system. However, 
local decreases in entropy sometimes occur within such a global closed system. Typical examples 
include nuclear fusion and the emergence of life. 
Self-Organization and Chaos Theory: When one causes a physical object like a piece of paper to 
fall, it may fall in a number of different ways. One cannot predict the manner in which it will fall. 
Chaos theory is expressed mathematically such that all factors are necessarily determined. Yet, 
predictions of individual motions are ineffectual. Chaotic motion is the general term for aperiodic 
and irregular motion. Blood does not flow at a fixed speed nor in units of a fixed quantity but 
fluctuates internally. The distinguishing feature of this motion is its sensitivity to slight differences in 
initial conditions. The same operation can give rise to different states each time it occurs (the baker’s 
transformation). There are many dimensions other than integer dimensions (for example, 
dimensions of 2.26, 3.14, etc.). 
Phenomena like vortices and tornados are typical examples of “emergence.” Certain forms of 
motion only appear spontaneously. There is no specific reason or cause underlying a given 
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occurrence. Internal randomness (fluctuation, contingency and unnecessity) is included within the 
system. The chain of processes by which certain forms of motion appear from internal randomness 
is “self-organization.” This process causes the internal appearance of a new reality. 
A “form that sustains motion” while drawing in surrounding energy is called a “dissipative 
structure” (e.g., vortices and tornadoes), while an “equilibrium structure” is a by-product of a form of 
movement that remains when motion ceases (e.g., crystallization). In mathematical terms, this is akin 
to the emergence of a new variable. However, this variable generally vanishes within a short time. 
When a stable form of movement appears, this is referred to as the formation of a “new species.” 
Characteristics of Philosophy: While considering the mechanisms and characteristics of the 
above scientific formulations, I will now contemplate on the characteristics considered necessary for 
philosophy. 
First, it is necessary to topicalize experiences of the kind found at the center of processes. 
Complete noesis in the midst of a process is impossible. Conversely, the “noetic-act–experience” 
found in settings where noesis and act are connected is topicalized. 
To also posit that complete noesis comes into being in the midst of a process would be stretching 
the argument too far. Whitehead’s Process and Reality provides an example of this. Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition, meanwhile, topicalizes both processes and the experience of being present 
in a process. The topicalized experience here is “intensity.” 
Viewed in terms of cognitive science, ecological psychology questions the perception centered 
within action. The indicators used when adjusting one’s speed or direction while in motion are 
“optical flow,” while the indicator used to decide one’s reaction to an object flying toward one, or is 
otherwise approaching, is the “time remaining between the acting subject and an object.” This time, 
the remaining time of the approach, is of a distinct character. Gibson describes this as “ecological 
perception.” 
It is “autopoiesis” that incorporates the question of how “options for new actions” are established 
within processes. Autopoiesis has two central axes. The first is found in the intermittent appearance 
of recurring operations within sustainable systems. Represented visually, the system continues to 
operate in a circular manner. The system is merely maintaining its operation. Yet this very 
maintenance gives rise to a separation of the internal and from the external, followed by the 
separation of self and the environment. Simply by continuing its operation, the system 
simultaneously and continuously gives rise to other states. This is the scene of category emergence. I 
have come to term the simultaneous and continual creation of other states through the performance 
of a given action as “dual operation.” 
When the system has maintained its operation in a circular manner and separated the internal the 
and external, the second axis of autopoiesis arises in the question of how to decide which is internal 
and which external. Fixing either a shift in viewpoint or a principle that decides which is the internal 
presupposes the existence of a principle that determines the internal. The system must fix the internal 
through its operation. “The sense of touch,” that is, “ tactile sense” is at work here. When the sense of 
touch touches external reality, the self too is touched. It is the sense of touch that bears the burden of 
the dual operation of noesis and the bifurcation of touch. 
The second characteristic of philosophy lies in the question of how to adopt the mechanisms 
relating to the manner in which the noetic-act–experience that is within processes brings about “self-
formation.” Experience becoming higher-order and turning toward an elevation that observes all 
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things itself reduces the possibilities of experience. Knowing what the occurring phenomena are 
transforms the self to a gaze that observes differently from the noetic act. 
Faced with a phenomenon grasped as an observer observes, experience must be advanced 
while the phenomena themselves may yet appear. Here, a distinctive “reduction–bracketing” is 
necessary. This can be expressed in various ways, including making an act function such as to betray 
the observer, acting to increase the options for acts within the observer’s field of vision, or utilizing 
an image within one’s noetic abilities to expand the possibilities for acts. 
 
Transcendental Empiricism: The genealogy of philosophy able to internalize these two 
components is generally labeled “transcendental empiricism.” Within the history of philosophy, we 
can add a further branch descending from Schelling, Bergson, and Deleuze. (The history of philosophy 
is a treasure trove for the drawing of additional branches.) Its headings can be set out as follows: 
(1) Questioning of foundational arguments is carried out not from a foundation of knowledge but 
along a course that widens the options for knowledge. Foundational arguments are continually used 
to suggest the possibilities that reality may be otherwise. 
(2) As a result, the premises are explained in the form of always-provisional configurations 
(assumptions, theses, setups); explanation is thereby restricted to transcendental relativism (Husserl). 
(3) The bounds of reality are not predetermined. On the contrary, various subject matters and 
empirical information are utilized to move toward an expansion of reality. 
(4) There is no explanation of the conditions for the possibility of experience; rather, the conditions 
for the possibility of the expansion of experience are called into question. In other words, inquiry is 
directed toward increasing the possibilities of experience itself and heightening its flexibility. With 
Hegel, not fulfilling (3), this turns into transcendental teleology. This is an absolute idealism wherein 
purpose does not exist externally but within a system. In other words, the boundaries of phenomena 
are predetermined. 
(5) Phenomena are considered with reference to the possibility that they could always be otherwise. 
The presentation of options that advance experience becomes central, rather than logical skepticism. 
If ideas and inspiration can be spread to diverse domains including empirical science, art, and 
techniques of the body, the bounds of reality will change by themselves. This will be all the more 
effective as it is often unknown what exactly has happened, particularly when approaching the body. 
(6) It is considered necessary to ensure that there are options somewhere within the mechanisms 
of contemplation. For example, objects such as currency, nation, or indeed language come to be 
questioned in connection with what constitutes their authenticity. In the case of currency, there are 
in fact many in use alongside legal tender, and there is no way to determine an authentic one. The 
boundaries of language, too, cannot be fixed. Simply playing music on Instagram fulfills a linguistic 
function. There is no way to determine what makes an authentic nation. We are approaching a stage 
in which cyber nations will be possible. The definition of a nation is that it has sovereignty, a territory, 
and a people. The “extremist state” that claims responsibility when terrorist acts occur all over the 
world likely exists in the cyber phase-domain. The concept of territory can no longer be restricted to 
the physical. 
(7) In this case, the operations of reality are heavily reliant on what they use as a model. Schelling 
uses non-equilibrium mechanics while Bergson uses what should be termed a “theory of human 
evolution.” When these models contain an “issue” that is not easily resolved, there develops a 
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philosophy with inward and vertical depth. In a sense, this heuristic process for the discovery of 
issues decides the success or failure of this type of philosophy. 
Items like those mentioned above are established as the unit-ideas of transcendental empiricism. 
These items can be added to as necessary, and may be partially rewritten. Individual domain specific 
systems are then formed in the periphery. Peripheral systems form their own domains. There are 
psychiatric systems, geo-economic systems, ecological systems, information systems, ethics systems, 
art systems, and more, and when these shift toward expansion, the central system, that is, the whole 
system succeeds. 
The conceptual diagram below represents each domain. An Enzyklopädie of transcendental 
empiricism would take this pattern. The pattern itself is an “absolute pluralism,” with each domain 













Philosophy does not immediately appear within this diagram. Moving between various partially 
domain specific systems, it activates each of these domains in an inter-disciplinary manner 
(coordinator act), approaches emergence when a new domain arises (act of discovery), finds other 
forms of choice in a mode of rediscovery within stagnating systems, and as a whole creates new 
realities. Philosophy passes through individual domain specific experiences, changing their form 
(metamorphosis) each time it does so, and moves forward while improving the mode in which the 
experience itself progresses. If a “name for the subject of the experience” that is molded as it changes 
shape is necessary, then the “mind” (Geist) may be considered fitting. 
(1) The activity that forms a sustainable system making use of certain leads and materials is a 
productive act that relates to the arrival and maintenance of the system itself. For example, 
discovering new rehabilitation techniques is a productive act if they continue to function sustainably, 
and discovering techniques of artistic production is a productive act if they continue to function 
consistently. Further, orienting function in various ways in the midst of the operation of a pre-existing 
system, while being present in the movement of the system, is a corrective act and traditionally an 
extension of ethics. Moreover, if regularity is discovered in the movement of individual systems and 
a rule is extracted, this raises the question of genuineness. This is a cognitive act. The rule itself shapes 
a shadow region for the operation of each system. The minimum logic that forms the premise of the 
rule is the prerequisite for the operation of the system. 
(2) These acts shape the codes of progress/stagnation, freedom/restraint, truth/falsehood, becoming 
further subdivided specifics under each individual code. This is the program that is formed, diverging 
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within each system. These codes traditionally correspond to beauty, good, and truth, overturning 
them and progressing experience.  
(3) Each system naturally divides self and environment through its own operations. The observer 
indexes the aggregate of each environment, what should be termed “the environment of the 
environment,” and can access a sort of symbolic “overall representation.” This is the “world.” The 
“world” can provide various prompts for a system’s building and formation; its operation, adjustment, 
and orienting; and for assessing its validity. The operations of the system are not guided by the world, 
but rather have no choice but to bracket the world continually as they advance. This is “behavioral 
reduction,” and the world remains in external intimacy (extimacy) through reduction. The image of 
the world, responding to the operation of the system, changes shape each time. 
 
